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Abstract
A human-rights  based  approach  (HRBA)  to  development  is  increasingly  promoted  by 
researchers  and  adopted  by  development  actors.  The  approach  integrates  the  fields  of 
development and human rights by transforming development goals into obligations, but is 
criticized for being more rhetorical than brought to actual change on the ground. This study 
compares an international non-governmental organization's (INGO) and a state agency's use 
of the HRBA, by investigating the cases of ActionAid and Sida. Findings from interviews and 
documents show that both have put the HRBA into practice but strive to fully integrate it. The 
main  difference  in  implementations  are  their  relations  with  governments  and  the  poor. 
ActionAid as an INGO work more with participation of the poor and assist them to claim their  
rights, whereas Sida as a state agency work in partnerships with governments and support 
them to meet their obligations. Both actors face problems with accountability, due to lack of 
legal mechanisms, inability of states to meet obligations or the need to maintain diplomatic 
relations. The thesis concludes by suggesting that human rights and development researchers 
and  practitioners  need  to  clarify  roles  of  responsibilities  and  develop  guidelines  for 
accountability for a successful implementation of the HRBA.
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1 Introduction
The human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development emerged in the 1990s as a result 
of experience and lessons learnt from previous development paradigms and strategies. Earlier 
approaches  to  development  were  no  longer  considered  to  be  long-term  sustainable  and 
believed to maintain unequal power-relations between North and South (Darrow and Thomas 
2005: 472; Kindornay et al 2012: 473, 477). Around the same time, additional actors than 
traditional  multi-  or  bilateral  institutions  gained  importance  in  international  development. 
International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) entered the global political arena and 
promoted the inclusion of human rights  in the development agenda (Baehr 2009;  Brül in 
Steffek and Hahn 2010: 181, 185; Potter et al 2008: 276, 323). 
The HRBA aims to overcome the deficits of other approaches, by addressing 
structures  that  may  cause  underdevelopment,  such  as  inequality  in  power. Darrow  and 
Thomas  explain  that:  “[a]  rights-based  approach  treats  development  issues  as  matters  of 
obligation  and  right,  rather  than  discretion  or  charity.  It  focuses  on  raising  levels  of 
accountability  in  the  development  process  by  identifying  claim-holders  (and  their 
entitlements)  and  corresponding  duty-bearers  (and  their  obligations)”  (2005:  511). 
Accountability,  together  with  participation,  transparency  and  non-discrimination  are  by 
researchers generally agreed on core principles that characterizes the approach. By applying 
those principles to development, the HRBA is believed to result in a more equal development 
cooperation and sustainable results (Darrow and Thomas 2005; Gready 2008; Jonsson 2004; 
Uvin  2007).  The  rights  referred  to  are  the  ones  stated  in  the  United  Nations'  Universal 
Declaration  on  Human  Rights  (UDHR),  and  the  HRBA integrates  with  the  international 
human  rights  framework,  by  perceiving  development  as  the  realization  of  those  rights 
(Crawford 2010: 93).
Thus, the HRBA merges the fields of development and human rights, by making 
use of human rights tools in development (Redondo 2009, Rezaeenezhad and Kordnaeij 2012, 
Uvin  2007).  Close  to  the  new  millennium,  there  was  an  overarching  recognition  and 
acceptance among development practitioners, to include human rights in their work. The trend 
of adopting a HRBA started among global development actors such as the UN, bilateral state 
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agencies and INGOs (Banik 2010: 34;  Jonsson 2004; Redondo 2009; Uvin 2007: 597). The 
different actors are argued to have separate roles and tasks in development, whereas goals are 
often the same and they are believed to complete each other in the strive towards those (Baehr 
2009; Alston 2005). For example, state actors normally have the mandate and obligations to 
negotiate, promote and fulfill development objectives, whereas INGOs can operate closer to 
and easier include targeted groups (Potter et al 2008: 314, 316). The differences between the 
development  actors  can be  assumed to  affect  their  use  of  HRBA and show variations  in 
implementation. However, most scholars criticize the HRBA for being mainly rhetorical. It is 
argued to be well  developed in theory, but not translated into practice to the same extent  
(Darrow and Thomas 2005; Banik 2010; Kindornay et al 2012; Redondo 2009). 
1.1 Research Problem and Aim
Since NGOs and state agencies have different roles, strengths and weaknesses in promoting 
development, this study derives from the assumption that those differences are present also 
when  implementing  a  HRBA.  Earlier  research  have  showed  that  development  actors  in 
general are  failing with putting the HRBA into practice,  but any distinctions between the 
actors have not been made. The aim of this thesis is to find out how a HRBA is used by a 
state-actor and an INGO, and if there are differences in their implementation of the approach. 
It will do so by investigating and comparing the cases of ActionAid and Sida, to see how they 
translate a HRBA into practice. The thesis seeks to answer the following questions:
How do ActionAid and Sida differ in their implementation of a HRBA to development? What  
are the strengths and weaknesses of the respective actor's use of the HRBA?
The INGO ActionAid and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 
were some of the first international development actors that took on a HRBA, and started 
working  with  the  approach  at  about  the  same  time,  1998  respective  2001  (Darrow  and 
Thomas 2005: 480; Kindornay et al 2012: 480-481). Thus, these two organizations have had 
time to develop strategies, try them out in practice and evaluate their work and results.  As 
many argue that a HRBA often fails to reach implementation, it is motivated to investigate 
how successfully the organizations have employed the approach.  The analytical framework 
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will identify what is meant by implementation and which components to look for in the two 
cases.
1.2 Outline of the Study
First, methods and choice of cases are described. The material is presented, and how it has 
been  collected  and  analyzed  is  explained.  Limitations  of  the  study  are  described  and 
expectations of what conclusions that can be drawn. Second, I outline the academic material 
that is used in a literature review. It  discusses prospects and constraints of a HRBA that are 
brought  up in  the  academic  debate,  as  well  as  strengths  and weaknesses  of  the  different 
development actors.  The literature review forms an analytical framework that combines the 
discussions, and through which the empirical material is analyzed. Third, a critical analysis is 
applied to documents  and interviews, where  findings are  related to the existing academic 
debate and earlier studies on the topic. Further, findings are compared to each other to sort out 
differences and similarities, and to see what strengths and weaknesses the respective actors 
have in the use of a HRBA. Finally, main findings are summed up in the conclusions, where 
also the research questions are answered.
3
2 Methodology
This thesis undertakes a qualitative research design,  and takes the form of a comparative 
study between ActionAid and Sida. The process involves collection, review and analysis of 
contemporary research and earlier case studies on the topic, as well as documentary data and 
interviews  to  gather  information  on  the  cases  chosen  in  this  study  (Gillham  2010:  21; 
Marshall  and  Rossman  2006:  164).  The  study  involves  empirical  analysis,  and  aims  to 
describe and explain differences between the two actors use' of the approach (Esaiasson et al 
2007: 35). It describes by defining differences, and those can possibly be explained by their 
characteristics as development actors. Empirical findings are also tested to the theories to see 
how they match existing research. A  weakness of the HRBA, defined by scholars, is that it is 
often mentioned and promoted at policy level, where less often implemented (eg Banik 2010; 
Uvin 2004).  If this study shows that these actors have met strategies and theories, they are 
examples that prove the critique wrong. However, if these actors have failed with translating 
policy into practice, earlier scholars' research are still relevant and future research needs to 
further  focus  on  why practical  implementation  of  a  HRBA  is  failing.  Consequently, 
conclusions will either strengthen or weaken the theories, or purpose certain modifications in 
existing theoretical assumptions (Esaiasson et al 2007: 41-42). Thus, the study have theories 
to  test,  but  emphasis  is  on  the  cases  and  comparison.  This  implies  a  theory  consuming 
investigation primarily, as these cases are central focus, and not to which extent results can be 
generalized to other cases (Esaiasson 2007: 99- 100).
2.1 Comparative Design
ActionAid  and  Sida  are  often  referred  to  in  academic  literature  as  some  of  the  first 
development actors that adopted a HRBA (eg Banik 2010; Crawford 2010), and they will here 
illustrate examples of development actors that use the approach (Esaiasson et al 2007: 38). 
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The two cases are compared because of their homogeneity that serves to describe and analyze 
the use of a HRBA and their heterogeneity, one being a governmental state agency and one 
being an INGO, that possibly will  explain differences  in  implementation (Esaiasson et  al 
2007: 102). They are homogenous as they are relatively big players in development, with a 
common vision to eradicate extreme poverty. They are both using a HRBA and adopted the 
approach around the same time. They operate in several different countries over the world, 
often through partnerships (AAI 2004; Regeringskansliet 2010). 
The entry point  is that the actors are different, and both try to implement  the same 
approach to development. My internship at ActionAid inspired the choice of research problem 
and accessibility to interviewees played a deliberative role in choosing organizations for the 
study.  How the actors  make use of the HRBA principles guides the investigations,  and I 
further examine whether the actors' different roles can explain an assumed variation in the 
implementation of a HRBA (Esaiasson et al 2007: 155). 
2.2 Literature
The literature review systematizes and structures the contemporary academic debate logically, 
which serves as a ground for an analytical framework through which the data will be analyzed 
(Esaiasson  2007:  238). Material  is  chosen  from  an  intersection  of  human  rights  and 
development, as the HRBA merges the two fields. No explicit juridical literature is used, as 
this thesis still  focus on development cooperation.  The literature review elaborates on the 
arguments of the authors that are brought up in the introduction. Additional articles are used 
for  examples  of  other  cases  where  a  HRBA have  been used.  Peer-reviewed  articles  and 
influential contemporary works are used to ensure literature of quality and relevance. 
2.3 Empirical Material
The empirical material are documents from Sida and ActionAid,  combined with interviews 
with employees for  a more in-depth understanding of the practical  implementation of the 
approach.  Using different types of material is a strength as it can reveal richer information. 
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For  example,  interviews  have  highlighted  issues  that  documents  have  not  shown. 
Documentary data and interviews are evaluated in light of the existing academic debate and 
the research questions guide to keep the analysis focused (Gillham 2010: 94, 96). Empirical 
findings  from  ActionAid  and  Sida  are  compared  to  each  other  and  related  to  examples 
regarding similar issues.  Hence,  to measure the use of the HRBA principles,  findings are 
weighed to and compared with the other actor as a reference point (Esaiasson 2007: 169).
2.3.1 Source criticism
Source criticism is  necessary to  ensure material  of  quality  and an objective analysis.  For 
authenticity and credibility of documents, the purpose of the document, the author and the 
publisher  are  checked  (Bryman  2008:  81-82,  527).  The  risk  of  biases  due  to  personal 
experience and relations is present, however relations to employees at both organizations may 
help even those out. I am aware of that during the internship at ActionAid, observations were 
made subconsciously and consciously that may influence my perception (Bryman 2008: 402, 
413).  To  handle  issues  of  subjectivity  and  biases,  the  study aims  to  critically  review all 
material, apply rereading and hold a transparent documentation and explanation of its analysis 
(Bryman  2008:  391-392).  Evidence  derive  from  explicit  knowledge  where  findings  and 
results are explained, and the influence of tacit or “intuitive knowledge” aims to be minimized 
for an as factual and evidence-based analysis as possible (Gillham 2010: 31-32). 
2.3.2 Documents
Documentary sources have in previous research been used to investigate how NGOs use a 
HRBA and treat the the issue of accountability (O'Dywer and Unerman 2010). Therefor, it is 
relevant to use documents for information in this study, also from Sida as a state-actor. The 
strength of documentary data is that they are produced in natural settings to guide employees 
and  report  their  work,  and  not  with  the  aim for  research,  which  enhances  their  validity 
(Bryman 2008:515).  On the other hand, as most documents used are publicly available as a 
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means to perform good governance and transparency, there is a risk for that they exclude 
negative aspects.  Documents used are strategies,  policies,  resource books, evaluations and 
reports from ActionAid and Sida, and they are treated as primary sources. The material was 
collected from the organizations' websites and offices in Stockholm.  
ActionAid is currently on its second strategy that involves a HRBA, but have, according 
to Archer (2011), practiced the approach since 1998, which later was taken up in strategies. 
Thus,  ActionAid  International's  first  strategy  for  a  HRBA,  2005-2010  “Rights  to  End 
Poverty” and its review “Taking Stock 3” (2010) are used. ActionAid's annual report 2011 is 
also used as it evaluates the final year of this strategy. Resource books and the current strategy 
“Peoples Action in Practice” for 2012-2017 are used for additional information. When writing 
ActionAid, I refer to ActionAid International as an INGO, which gathers all countries with 
ActionAid offices, and they use the same strategies.
Sida got their first strategy including a HRBA in 2001. Since 2003, it is decided by the 
Swedish government that a rights perspective should influence all Sida's  work and that a 
HRBA should  be  applied.  I  focus  on  their  latest  policy  for  democratic  development  and 
human rights 2010-2014 “Change for Freedom”, which elaborates on the HRBA. Sida's report 
“Resultat för Rättvisa och Utveckling” (Results for Justice and Development) (2012) is used, 
as it is their first evaluation of the HRBA, with results from the first year of “Change for 
Freedom”. An internal document from Sida, called “HRBA- Lessons Learnt “ (2012), is also 
used.
2.3.3 Interviews
Interviews are semi-structured as they  allow for both standardized and in-depth questions 
where respondents can elaborate on answers, and this type of interviews have been used in 
previous investigations on the use of a HRBA (O'Dywer and Unerman 2010). An outline of 
questions, regarding e.g. implementation of and challenges with the HRBA, is used to guide 
the interviews (Bryman 2008:438; Appendix 1). Sampling is purposive, as the interest is in 
the specific  for these cases.  The sample is  biased to a  group with similar  characteristics; 
employees at development organizations working with a HRBA. The population consists of 
ActionAid and Sida's employees and findings are expected to be relevant for the cases, as 
interviews are intended to extract information and get  a deeper understanding, and not to 
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compare answers within organizations (Bryman 2008: 183, 376, 458- 459; Esaiasson et al 
2007: 178). ActionAid Sweden's employees are representatives for the whole organization 
ActionAid. 
Test-interviews  were  made to  practice  technique  and relevance  of  questions, 
however  questions  could  be  adapted  once  in  the  surroundings  (Bryman  2008:  443).  For 
informed consent, interviewees got an introduction to the research, asked for permission to be 
tape-recorded, ensured that all material is confidential and that their anonymity will be kept 
(Bryman 2008:123).  Interviews were  held in  Swedish or  English  and then  transcribed to 
English. The interviews varied in length depending on elaboration on answers and questions, 
but  lasted  on  average  40  minutes  each.  With  Swedish  as  mother-tongue  and  fluency  in 
English,  translation and transcription went  well  (Bryman 2008:453).  The risk of  different 
interpretation of questions and answers is however always present. 
Eight interviews  with  ActionAid  Sweden  employees  were  conducted  during  my 
internship at the organization. The first interview at Sida was organized through contacts and 
the following three through the “snow-ball effect”, where I got in contact with people who are 
deeply involved with the HRBA. Two of those do not work at Sida as of today but responded 
as representatives of the agency. For a just comparison, only four randomly picked ActionAid 
interviews are used.
2.4 Limitations
The study aims to hold internal validity and draw conclusions to the cases and comparison of 
ActionAid and Sida. Looking at additional cases would be interesting, but not manageable in 
terms  of  time  and  resources  (Esaiasson  et  al  2007:  113).  The study  strives  for  in-depth 
understanding of this comparison and have no ambition of external validity, but may serve as 
an input for future research on similar issues (Esaiasson et al 2007: 177). As ActionAid and 
Sida are typical cases of development actors that use a HRBA, it can be questioned whether 
this comparison mirrors the broader picture in international development. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
argues, there is a common misunderstanding that case study research cannot be generalizable 
to other cases, and believes that it is an important method where results have the potential to 
be applied to other cases. Hence, this study speaks for itself, but findings may be of relevance 
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for other studies regarding the same issues, where the same methods can be used and similar  
questions can be asked (Bryman 2008: 31-32, 55; Esaiasson et al 2007: 100, 187).
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3 Literature Review
The literature review elaborates on themes brought up in the introduction, and discuss what 
contemporary research focus on. Focus lies within strengths and weaknesses of the HRBA, as 
well as (I)NGOs' and state agencies' respective roles in development and human rights. The 
discussions result  in an analytical framework that will  guide the analysis of the empirical 
material. 
To clarify the concept, it is generally agreed that a HRBA is a working method 
that  aims  to  apply  the  principles  of  participation,  accountability,  transparency  and  non-
discrimination in all  processes for development  efforts  (Banik 2010; Darrow and Thomas 
2005; Kindornay et al 2012; Jonsson 2004; Uvin 2007). Many scholars use the term “rights-
based  approach”,  and  some  argue  that  different  wording  implicates  differences  in  the 
approaches, as a rights-based approach can (be assumed to) include any rights, such as local 
property rights, or anything considered to be just. A HRBA on the other hand, refers to human 
rights that are stated in conventions ratified by most nations, which allows an international 
agreement and understanding of which rights that are considered as well as responsibilities 
that follow. However,  the definitions are used interchangeably, often in the same text (Banik 
2010: 37; Piron 2005). The rights that a rights-based approach refer to most often are the same 
as a HRBA, namely the human rights, and main characteristics which define the approaches 
are the same principles as mentioned above (Rezaeenezhad and Kordnaeij 2012: 49). Thus, 
this thesis does not differ a “rights-based approach” from a “human-rights-based approach” 
and  uses  the  abbreviation  HRBA,  except  when  quoting.  “Development”  refers  to  social, 
economic and political progress in a society, however there are definitions that concern more 
areas and there is no consensus on what is indicated by progress. This thesis do not specify a 
definition, due to the broad variation of it, but also as its focus stays with the working method 
HRBA and not which development objectives that are reached.
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3.1 The HRBA and its strengths
A HRBA is considered an alternative to traditional development approaches, such as service-
delivering and basic needs, by informing about and advocating for human rights, rather than 
implementing services, to reach development objectives (Kindornay et al 2012: 493). There 
are several advantages with a HRBA, that are brought up by researchers. According to Uvin, 
the  HRBA  encourages  redefinition  of  development  problems  into  “claims,  duties  and 
mechanisms that can promote respect  and adjudicate  violation of rights”.  This implies an 
increased focus on accountability,  which is  what “distinguish charity from claims” (2007: 
602). Banik agrees that creating claims and duties, makes development a responsibility and 
obligation rather than an act of solidarity and charity (2010: 37).  Gready also states that a 
HRBA makes development  an  entitlement  rather  than an  act  of  charity  (2008:  737),  and 
Jonsson  explains  that  the  approach  distances  from  charity  or  solidarity,  by  transforming 
development goals into obligations (2004: 16).  
That the HRBA addresses structural causes behind poverty and try to solve those 
rather than ease the symptoms, is often stated as the main difference from other development 
approaches.  Damman writes that  “[...] HRBA seeks to analyze inequalities which lie at the 
heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions 
of power that impede development progress” (2007: 518). Gready shares a similar view, that 
structural  courses  behind  poverty,  are  often  inequalities,  exclusion  and  unequal  power-
relations. Thus, a HRBA should focus on the poor, powerless and marginalized (2008: 742-
743).  In  line  with  others,  Banik  argues  that  “[i]ts  main  focus  areas  include  analysing 
inequalities, discriminatory practices and imbalance in power relations that often are the main 
obstacles to development” (2010: 36). Darrow and Thomas are of the same opinion and states 
that  a HRBA  looks  at  political  and  social  power  structures  behind  inequality  and 
underdevelopment, and is a more preventive than reactive strategy (2005: 487). Jonsson also 
stresses  its focus on legal and institutional reforms, which creates possibilities of changing 
structures and attacking root causes to the problems  (2004: 16).
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3.1.1 Integration of Human Rights in Development
Seeing development as a human right, which was stated already in the Declaration on the 
Right  to  Development  1986,  lays  ground  for  the  HRBA,  which  “integrates  the  norms, 
standards and principles of the international human rights system into the plans, policies and 
processes of development” (Rezaeenezhad and Kordnaeij 2012: 47). Human rights standards 
are directed to outcomes, whereas the principles relate to processes and many of them are 
adopted by a HRBA. Thus, values and polices are already set and stated in the rights and 
cannot be negotiable to the same extent as development goals. Darrow and Thomas confirms 
that HRBA does not have problems of what is considered as “good” development, as means 
and goal are that human rights are fulfilled, which enables for objectivity and equality when 
using the approach. Moreover, with a HRBA there is a legal framework to back up and justify 
development  work and involvement in a society (2005: 485-487). With the legal force of 
human rights comes accountability, which development often lacks. Thus, by combining the 
discourses  human rights  and development  with  a  HRBA to development,  a  human rights 
agenda can help reaching development goals (Redondo 2009: 36 -37). 
The rights referred to are the ones stated in the UDHR. They include basic rights 
which addresses our basic needs, but are extended to economic, social,  cultural,  civil  and 
political rights (Baehr 2009: 88; Ishay 2007: 391). Most nations have signed the declaration 
and one can assume an acceptance of the rights from those states. However, many argue that 
human rights beyond the basic rights are western liberal values and although most states have 
ratified them, western-based INGOs were drivers for the universalization of those values into 
human  rights.  Moreover,  there  may  have  been  both  political  and  economic  pressure  for 
signing the conventions (Ishay 2007: 389; Welch 2001: 151-152). Thus, a HRBA that strives 
for  equal  power-relations  within  development,  could  actually  be  seen  as  a  form of  post-
colonialism. Welch argues  that “[I]NGOs seek to enforce the application of human rights 
norms internationally,  particularly toward repressive states in the South,  in areas formerly 
colonized by the West” (2001: 151). However, as Baehr states, the rights can be justified as 
universal, not only for the UDHR that many have signed, but because the rights represent 
values that are relevant for and have roots in most cultures, and exists for the protection of all  
humanity.  Instead he thinks, the problem is  that those rights are mainly advocated for by 
Westerners (2009: 35-36, 46, 120). 
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3.1.2 Accountability
As argued by Gready, a HRBA makes humans rights-holders, rather than poor in need of aid, 
which moves development  from an act  of  charity  to  an issue of rights.  This changes the 
perception of poverty, by that people are no longer poor but in poverty because of reasons that 
someone  is  responsible  for.  But for  the  approach  to  have  any  value,  accountability  is 
necessary  (2008:  741-742). Both  Jonsson  and  Banik  states  that  increased  accountability 
comes  with  defining  duty-bearers,  rights-holders  and  their  roles  and  creating  claims  and 
duties (2004: 16 and 2010: 37), and Rezaeenezhad and Kordnaeij argues that this is central in 
a HRBA (2012: 48). 
 The 1986 declaration explains that all humans are responsible for development and for 
respecting everyone's rights, and that states have the duty (and right) to constantly improve 
circumstances for their citizens and realize their rights (Rezaeenezhad and Kordnaeij 2012: 
49).  States have traditionally been seen to have an obligation to deliver, protect and oversight 
human rights. They are also responsible to ensure that non-state actors do not violate any 
rights. According to Gready, “casting development in terms of rights suggests that the state 
has certain direct responsibilities for delivery“ (2008: 740). However, there are difficulties 
with defining which actor(s) that is/are responsible in global development processes, which 
lay ground for  the  issue of  accountability  in  a  HRBA and its  effects  on governance and 
authority structures. 
Thus,  rights  are  traditionally  established  in  citizenships,  through  relation  between 
citizen and state, where the state has to protect and ensure rights the citizen hold, whereas the 
citizen has to follow certain obligations such as the rule of law. However, as Hird-Younger 
writes: “[a] state-centered framework does not adequately reflect the transnational reality of 
rights-based approaches,  and therefore a state-centered model of accountability,  such as a 
territorially bounded concept of citizenship, cannot adequately determine the accountability 
for these rights“ (2010: 46). She also argues that: “[t]here is little consensus with regard to 
which institution or entity  is,  or should be,  responsible for determining the fulfillment  of 
rights  or  defining  how  they  should  be  implemented.  This  confusion  stems  from  the 
contradiction that rights-based approaches originate at a global level, but in a context in which 
traditional  conceptions  of  territorially  bound  accountability,  authority  and  power  are  not 
always  applicable“  (Hird-Younger  2010:  45).  Thus,  a  HRBA  have  developed  with 
globalization,  which  makes citizenship  and rights  relations  complicated,  as  rights  are  not 
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linked  to  territory  such  as  citizenship  is.  Hence,  responsibility  for  human  rights  in 
international treaties does not fit with the traditional state-centered model, and a HRBA have 
developed without the development of institutions to ensure such rights are fulfilled. There 
are currently many different actors involved in human rights and development, both non-state 
and state, and who is accountable, if any, and for what is often unclear. 
With  globalization  there  is  no  single  power,  although  states  still  hold  the  main 
responsibility  and  power  of  its  citizens.  The  HRBA  contributes  to  accountability  by 
strengthening rights-holders  to claim their  rights,  as well  as duty-bearers to  deliver  them. 
Gready stresses  that  the  use  of  law is  crucial  for  a  HRBA to  have  any value  and make 
development  an  entitlement  for  states  and other  actors,  but acknowledges  that  there  is  a 
challenge to make accountability mechanisms function and it is unclear whether it will serve 
downwards to those affected or upwards to donors (2008: 736, 738).
3.2 Roles of NGOs and state agencies
Earlier,  governments  had  the  major  role  in  decision-making  and  implementation  of 
development policies at a national level. In the first decades of development efforts, the role 
of the state was to be involved in every part of society, in particular the economy. In the 
1980s,  non-state  actors,  in  particular  private,  gained  influence  in  economies  and  with 
globalization  and  an  increasingly  integrated  world,  more  actors  have  been  included  and 
influential in international development (Potter et al 2008: 275, 312). INGOs have since the 
1990s had an increasingly important role in international relations and as non-state actors in 
global  governance (Brül  in  Steffek and Hahn 2010:  181,  185).  Potter et  al  confirms that 
INGOs are now prominent  in  debates  and problem-solving regarding global  development 
issues. With globalization, governance in international relations are no longer the role of the 
state solely (2008: 276, 323). Further, Potter et al argues that “NGOs do not set development 
policy,  but  they  increasingly  describe  to  development  ideologies  […],  and  their  role  in 
influencing policy formulation and implementation have risen rapidly in the past two decades 
[...]”  (2008:  319).  However,  governments  are  still  seen  as  having  the  primary  role  in 
development, and the millennium development goals (MGDs) are examples of which state-
actors are responsible to bring about (Potter et al 2008: 316).
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As clarified above, states, or governments, have the responsibility and mandate 
to  negotiate  internationally  to  establish  multilateral  agreements  (Potter  et  al  2008:  314). 
Human  rights  standards  are  examples  of  such  an  agreement.  However,  Baehr  states  that 
NGOs have played an important role in the international standard setting of human rights, 
such as the UDHR. This by preparing and promoting the rights, to hinder and prohibit human 
rights violations and protect potential victims (2009: 64, 76-77).  Donnelly also stresses that 
NGOs were drivers for getting human rights declared in UN covenants (in Baylis et al 2011: 
503- 504). Thus, NGOs are recognized important players in international politics, in particular 
regarding human rights, but decisions still lie in the hands of state or intergovernmental actors 
(Baehr 2009: 128).
Some  argue  that  governments  and  civil  society  have  different  interests  and 
agendas (Potter et  al  2008:  316).  But regarding development  and human rights,  there are 
defined objectives  which  lie  in  the  interest  of  both  actors  to  reach,  in  UDHR that  most 
governments have ratified and INGOs are advocating for, as well as development goals such 
as the MDGs. There are states that systematically violate human rights, but Donnelly means 
that governments cannot deny the obligations they have taken on by ratifying international 
human rights treaties (in Baylis et al 2011: 499). According to Nelson and Dorsey, even poor 
governments,  are  obliged  to  respect  and  realize  its  citizens  human  rights  (2008:  173). 
However, governments may, for various reasons, not always hold the resources and capacities 
to ensure human rights for its citizen. In countries with inadequately functioning national 
institutions, non-state actors, in particular civil society in form of NGOs, work to put pressure 
on governments as a response to its shortcomings, and have in cases taken on a role to cover 
deficits of governments (Potter et al 2008: 276, 314-315). But, their operations and impact are 
limited,  “because implementation and enforcement of human rights is a state responsibility, 
NGOs, no less than states and international organisations, must usually act through, rather 
than around, states” (Donnelly in Baylies et al 2011: 504).
3.3 Weaknesses of the HRBA
Researchers criticize the HRBA to be well developed in theory but not translated into practice 
to the same extent (Darrow and Thomas 2005: 472; Kindornay et al 2012: 473, 477, Piron 
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2005). Uvin argues that since the emphasis has been on the rhetorical part of the discourse, its 
meaning is still unclear. He states that several NGOs struggle with the implementation, but it 
remains uncertain whether it will lead to actual change in programs and for the poor (Uvin 
2007:  597,  603).  Banik believes  that  the  approach  have  not  shown  its  potential  due  to 
insufficient institutions in developing countries and lack of support from political leaders to 
renew development thinking discourage practical implementation. He is uncertain of whether 
the HRBA, with its advantages, will dominate development efforts (2010: 35, 38). Damman 
states that “[...] elaboration of the human rights-based approach to development is still in its 
early  stages.  Human  right  lawyers,  the  UN  human  rights  bodies,  the  academia,  non-
governmental  organizations  and  the  international  development  community  have  found 
themselves in unfamiliar territory trying to define its content and apply it in practice” (2007: 
532). Gready agrees that  it  remains  to  be seen what  HRBA will  offer,  but  that efforts  of 
translating theory into practice are currently made (2008: 745). 
According  to  Gready  (2008),  another  weakness  of  the  HRBA is  that  it  is 
resource demanding in terms of time and money.  These investments are done to include the 
marginalized  and  encourage  active  participation,  which  can  be  seen  as  a  development 
achievement  in itself  as it  is  part  of empowerment.  However,  Uvin is  sceptical  about the 
principles of inclusion and participation's real meaning, as their importance was recognized 
decades ago. He further states that participation makes the HRBA costly (2007: 604). Darrow 
and  Thomas  mean  that  there  are  practical  limitations  of  to  which  extent  participation  is 
possible, as people who are struggling for daily survival may not be able to attend workshops 
and meetings regarding their own development (2005: 485, 510). Kindornay et al agree, and 
explain that the HRBA may have the unintended negative consequences of “forcing” locals to 
actively participate in development projects, as well as putting extra workload in terms of 
administration  and  evaluation  on  development  professionals  (2012:  489).  Evaluation  is 
always an issue in development, and demands additional time and financial resources, and 
critique goes that a HRBA lacks indicators to measure progress and results (Banik 2010: 40, 
Darrow and Thomas 2005: 510). 
Additionally, the HRBA's claim of equality can be questioned. Banik brings up 
the issue of developing countries' dependence on financial aid from other states, where despite 
the focus on ownership, there are still unequal power-relations between recipients and donors. 
Accountability mechanisms are often inadequate, where donors seldom are held accountable 
by those effected,  and responsibility  often  lies  within the  recipient  country solely (Banik 
2010: 46). Banik further means that the approach is imposed on developing countries, rather 
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than being an initiative coming from inside, which obstructs chances for success and equality 
in relations (2010: 40).
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4 Analytical Framework
4.1 Definition
This thesis uses a shortened version the United Nations' Organization for High Commission 
on Human Rights (OHRCH) definition of a HRBA. They acknowledge there is no one recipe 
for it, however there are characteristics that are agreed on by the UN, which are in line with 
earlier mentioned scholars: All programs of development cooperation, policies and assistance 
should  further  the  realization  of  human  rights  as  laid  down  in  the  UDHR  and  other 
international  human rights  instruments,  and principles  and standards  deriving from those, 
should guide all phases of programming in all sectors. Development cooperation contributes 
to the development of the capacities of “duty-bearers” to meet their obligations and of “rights-
holders”  to  claim  their  rights  (OHCHR 2006:  35).  The  HRBA recommends  adoption  of 
following  elements  in  poverty  reduction  polices  and  programs;  focus  on  the  poor  and 
marginalized, analyze underlying power relations and root causes of discrimination, ensure 
that both processes and concrete poverty reduction targets are consistent with international 
human rights standards,  ensure transparency, accountability  and participation,  and identify 
indicators and benchmarks so that the progressive realization of economic and social rights 
can clearly be monitored (OHRCH 2006: 15). 
4.2 Accountability in a HRBA
Previous studies have shown examples of both state agencies and INGOs that have adopted 
the HRBA to development, where identifying duty-bearers and empowering rights-holders are 
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central concerns. Duty-bearers are in general the state, and governments are accountable to 
their citizens to ensure, and not violate, their rights.  However, as Banik argues, “[...] a HRBA 
also appears unclear on the exact nature of duties and obligations of national governments 
which are necessary to fulfill, protect and promote human rights” (2010: 40). 
Hird-Younger calls  for a form of transnational  accountability but admits that 
most scholars believe that states should be accountable and by using a HRBA to development, 
it becomes a tool for citizens to demand accountability (2010: 46).  Banik agrees that states 
have obligations to its citizens, but that a HRBA extends the duty-bearers and rights-holder 
relationship to  all  levels  of  society  (2010:  37).  Gready explains  that  the  state  hold  main 
responsibility to ensure human rights, but cannot be alone in this role (2008: 741). As Hird-
Younger describes, there are primarily non-state actors such as INGOs that use HRBA, and 
they also have to play in accountability (2010: 46). Additionally,  Jonsson points at that one 
person  or  actor  can  hold  both  duties  and  claims  (2004:  16).  Hence,  the  principle  of 
accountability provides no clear directives on responsibilities within the use of a HRBA, and 
Piron  explains  that  “[t]here  is  still  no  agreement  on  who the  “duty-holders”  and “rights-
bearers” are and how progress is to be measured” (2005: 20).
However, by claiming to represent a group of people, or taking on a mission 
working  with  them,  responsibility  naturally  follows.  The  issue  of  accountability  is  in 
particular present regarding (I)NGOs' use of a HRBA, as there are tensions in trying to hold 
states accountable while at the same time involving people in development programs without 
explicitly having to be accountable to those. Halpin and McLaverty argues that accountability 
is difficult to demand, and it is questionable if NGOs are accountable to those people and 
whether they can be held accountable (in Steffek and Hahn 2010: 71). According to Havrda 
and Kutílek,  there is for NGOs upward accountability, where they should be accountable to 
their supporters – state donors, market donors and private donors. Tools are to hold a high 
level  of  transparency  of  the  budget,  and  ensure  adequate  reporting  and  evaluation  of 
development projects. There is also downward accountability, meaning to be accountable to 
the poor, or those affected by the development projects and programs (in Steffek and Hahn 
2010: 169). In relation to this study, these forms of accountability can be applied also to state 
agencies. Upward accountability would then be to the own state, and additional accountability 
should exist towards partner countries' government.
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4.3 Possibilities of implementing a HRBA
Alston states that NGOs and governments have separate roles and tasks in global governance 
(2005: 27). Baehr argues that the different actors need each other, as NGOs are useful sources 
of information to the state, whereas governments have the power to attain the interests of 
NGOs (2009:  123).  Kamminga agrees that  governments  do have  responsibilities  for their 
citizens and tools to ensure their welfare, but they often consist of elites whereas NGOs often 
do, or have the possibility to, operate closer to the lower levels of society and bring up issues 
that governments miss or ignore. They are not rival actors in the development arena, rather 
they serve different functions and can cooperate (in Alston 2005: 110). In fact, the different 
actors  are  by  some  means  interdependent,  and  by  combining  their  efforts,  development 
objectives can be reached more efficiently (Potter et al 2008: 277, 323). 
Governments and state actors often possess more financial resources, and have 
the mandate and power  to bring change about by enforcing law and realize rights. Further, 
they have a more diplomatic stature in bilateral relations and international organizations, and 
can thereby affect decision-making in international agreements and influence other states to a 
larger  extent  (Donnelly  in  Baylis  et  al  2011:  503-  504).  Piron,  argues  that  bilateral  aid 
agencies are government departments, and should therefor “[...] be more directly obligated 
under  the  international  human  rights  regime  than  international  or  non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and can significantly shape the aid discourse” (2005: 19). 
NGOs, on the other hand, are often “smaller” organizations than governments, 
and can therefor operate and adapt more rapidly than larger, bureaucratic institutions have the 
possibility to do. Further, NGOs have a tradition of working closely with the poorest and 
marginalized  groups  in  society  (Potter  et  al  2008:  319).  Consequently,  developing  close 
relations with locals can increase participation and inclusion of the poor. According to Darrow 
and Thomas, conducting work through partnerships and local participation makes use of local 
knowledge and experiences and pinpoints ownership (2005: 506). Moreover,  Jonsson states 
that the principle of participation encourages grass-root engagement and can make people feel 
an “ownership” of their development (2004: 16). 
Advocacy to local, national and global powers is a common way of practicing a 
HRBA (Gready 2008: 743). INGOs can be assumed to have an advantage here, as states often 
need to maintain international diplomatic relations and cannot advocate as aggressively as 
INGOs for  other  nations  to  fulfill  their  entitlements.  However,  state-actors  may be  more 
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listened to since it is also in recipient governments' interest to uphold a good position in the 
global political arena and maintain a bilateral partnership. 
A HRBA  is  often  criticized  for  failing  in  implementation,  and  defined 
constraints are mainly those of resource demanding character. It is time consuming and results 
are difficult to measure, with the consequence that evaluation becomes tricky and costly. The 
intention of increased equality among those involved while conducting development has also 
been  questioned.  As  Banik  puts  it:  “[i]n  general,  advocates  of  conventional  (basic-needs 
based) development question to what extent approaches such as a HRBA really ‘reinvent’ 
development, as its proponents often claim.” (2010: 39). 
4.4 Analytical Focus
Considering the critique of the HRBA remaining mainly rhetorical, ActionAid and Sida are 
investigated  to  see  if  there  has  been  an  actual  change  in  the  way  development  work  is 
conducted or if  practices remain the same.  Emphasis is  on the integration and use of the 
principles  accountability  and  participation.  Accountability,  as  it  is  an  issue  with  a  lot  of 
tension around it and no clear statements on which actors should be accountable to whom in a 
HRBA to development. Also, the use of the accountability principle is likely differ between 
the two organizations, where state actors may have a stronger influence on other governments 
but INGOs can advocate more aggressively as they do not need to uphold bilateral relations. 
Participation is  chosen because INGOs as grass-root organizations are  assumed to ensure 
more participation by locals than governmental organizations,  whereas state agencies may 
easier involve the governments in developing countries.
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5 Analysis: A comparison of NGO and 
state implementation of the HRBA
In this chapter,  differences and similarities of ActionAid's  and Sida's  implementation of a 
HRBA are outlined.  The differences are  related the respective roles of the actors and the 
analysis seeks to explain strengths and weaknesses of the actors' use of the HRBA.
5.1 Understanding of the HRBA
ActionAid's strategy for 2005-2010 states the organization's aim to address unequal power-
relations and strengthen the HRBA, as well as “deepening our accountability in communities 
and countries where we work”, as a way to promote equatable power between North and 
South (AAI 2004: 4). In line with researchers as Damman (2007), Gready (2008) and Banik 
(2010),  ActionAid means that the causes of poverty are unequal and unjust power relations, 
and they use power analysis to identify those relations (AAI 2010: 58). Central to their HRBA 
is to support rights holders to organize and claim their rights, and hold duty bearers to account 
(AAI 2004:  5,  9-10,  25).  Mobilizing  and awareness-rising  are main strategies  on how to 
support rights-holders. Duty-bearers are addressed by pursuing them to accept responsibility, 
expose their violations and challenge them (AAI 2004: 37). 
Sida defines their HRBA as a working method that uses human rights instruments and 
mechanisms  to  reach  development  objectives.  It  builds  on  the  four  core  principles,  (as 
mentioned by Darrow and Thomas 2005; Gready 2008; Jonsson 2004 and Uvin 2007) and is 
based  on  the  rights  stated  in  UN  conventions. Sida's  emphasis  is  on  participation  and 
accountability, as these principles are central for rights holders to be able to claim their rights.  
To understanding power structures, power analysis is applied, by defining stakeholders, duty-
bearers and their relationship (Regeringskansliet 2010: 13, 32; confirmed by Respondent 3B). 
The policy states the importance of not only focusing on results, but also on the process,  
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which is by Gready (2008) argued to be central for the HRBA (Regeringskansliet 2010: 28, 
29).  Sida  works  through  dialogues  and  by  supporting  the  partner  governments  in  the 
protection of  human rights,  but  support goes also to  civil  society,  who's  role  in  ensuring 
participation  and increase  demands for  accountability  is  acknowledged (Regeringskansliet 
2010: 16; Sida 2012: 99, 103). 
As  formulated  by  Darrow  and  Thomas:  “[a] human  rights-based  approach  is  a 
framework  for  understanding  and  managing  the  negative  impacts  of  discrimination  and 
disempowerment, not a one-dimensional and static formula” (2005: 501). Nelson and Dorsey 
agrees that a HRBA do have set principles, however those are not a blueprint (2008: 106). 
Similarly, ActionAid and Sida both emphasis the need to adapt the HRBA to the context (AAI 
TSR 2010: 5, 20; Sida 2012: 16). 
5.2 Implementation and challenges
5.2.1 ActionAid
Interviews explained that ActionAid's use of a  HRBA implies assisting people to mobilize 
themselves, create awareness and use the existing potential and knowledge. It means that you 
go out in the field for a couple of years, together with local organizations and the poor, to  
identify issues that hinders development and map what rights that are unfulfilled. This follows 
by  a  program  plan,  education  of  human  rights  and  advocacy  to  state  officials.  When 
ActionAid  leaves  the  area,  locals  should  have  tools  to  continue  education  of  rights  to 
neighboring communities and inspire to advocacy, as a catalyst for further development and 
strive for fulfilled rights (Respondents 1A, 3A). Welch argues that evaluating NGOs' work is 
difficult and their impact may be little, but stresses the potential for a catalyst effect (2001: 
216). 
One ActionAid employee emphasized that in situations of starvation or in areas of deep 
poverty, people are not responsive for information meetings and workshops, and certain needs 
have  to  be  stilled  before  working  with  a  HRBA.  Hence,  it  is  not  possible  for  locals  to 
organize,  when  they  struggle  to  survive  the  day  (Respondent  4A).  Darrow and  Thomas 
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(2005), as well  as Kindornay et  al (2012) reflected on this issue of participation, and the 
problem seem to have been confirmed.
ActionAid's evaluation shows that implementation and impact of the HRBA have varied 
(AAI TRS 27).  Archer states that “[it] takes time to build understanding of a human rights-
based approach at all levels. ActionAid’s practice is inevitably uneven and this will be true of 
any  organization”  (2011:  353).  Staff  have  been  educated,  rights  holders  informed  and 
advocacy to governments have been practiced. There have been a strong commitment to the 
approach, but transition from service-delivering is still  in practice, in particularly in many 
African countries (AAI TSR 2010: 5, 20). However, scholars mention that despite distinction 
of a HRBA to other approaches, NGOs may operate both service-delivering, in human rights 
advocacy  and  in  emergencies  simultaneously  (Alston  2005:  96;  Welch  2001:  210),  and 
ActionAid do combine their  work with  service-delivering.  For  example,  when supporting 
locals in claiming their right to education, ActionAid may run a school as an example of what 
it could look like, but mostly to gain respect among locals as well as authorities. A physical 
project like a school building can justify the more abstract process of advocacy (Respondent 
1A). Kindornay et al bring up this importance of gaining trust, recognition and commitment 
by local rights holders as well as duty-bearers, and that service delivering can be an efficient 
tool for it (2012: 493).
Interviews  provided  fairly  similar  responses  but  also  different.  For  example,  some 
thought that the strategy and resource books, mirror the reality and were created as a response 
to  how ActionAid's  development  cooperation  functions.  Others,  however,  argued  that  the 
strategy is still relatively new (in particular the 2012-2017 strategy which further elaborates 
on the HRBA), and has not reach implementation yet.
5.2.2 Sida
Sida reports an extended use of the HRBA, and that strategies and staff's integration of the 
polices are increasingly improved. However, implementation and use if the principles vary 
and  depend  on  the  context  (Sida  2012:  16).  Employees  confirm  the  HRBA's  context-
dependency and the principles have different emphasis in different cases (Respondents 3B, 
4B). In  Kenya,  mentioning  accountability  created  tensions  as  it  would  challenge  current 
power structures,  but implementation of participation,  transparency and non-discrimination 
were successful. Where in Moldavia, non-discrimination was difficult as marginalization of 
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certain  groups  were  strongly  rooted  in  the  culture  (Sida  2012:  102,  106.)  Piron  (2005) 
identified that a challenge for state agencies is to perform all the principles of the HRBA 
simultaneously.  This  is  confirmed by Sida,  who states  that in  general,  accountability  and 
transparency have shown harder to practice that non-discrimination and participation (Sida 
2012: 107). 
Sida experiences that the HRBA and its principles are applied to a larger extent 
in preparation and analysis,  than in implementation and evaluation (Sida 2012: 118).  One 
interviewee admits that on state level, the approach is more rhetorical than practical. Partner 
governments may accept  the principles,  but not  really implement  them. Further,  civil  and 
political rights can be seen as too controversial,  as well  as having rights or the principles 
stated as goals (Respondent 3B). Banik mentions that the efforts of a HRBA to development 
in Malawi met the same challenge, where the human rights language was meet with a fear of 
that its implementation would create instability in society (2010: 41- 42). A Sida employee 
confirms that it can be easier to talk about the principles than about human rights per se, and 
sometimes only one of the principles is possible to work with (Respondent 3B).
Some of the employees state that it has taken time to get policy to practice and integrate 
it in all parts of the organization (Respondents 3B, 4B). Others argue that there has been a 
severe shift in the way Sida conducts development, and that a HRBA is well established in the 
organization, however it was admitted that service-delivering is still used. (Respondents 1B, 
2B).  Sida's  “HRBA  –  Lessons  Learnt”  showed  a  wide  variation  in  knowledge  and 
understanding  of,  as  well  as  interest  in,  the  HRBA principles,  something  interviewees 
suspected (2012 (2): 8; Respondent 2B, 4B). Consequently, differences in interpretation result 
in differences in use and impact.
Redondo believes  that  the  size  and variation of  UN makes it  difficult  to  ensure  an 
adoption of the approach to all organs and employees (2009: 34). Piron argues that problems 
of operationalizing often lies in that agencies having too many policies to focus on, education 
of the approach may be inadequate and it may be difficult to get all staff along (2005: 26-27). 
This could also explain why practical implementation of a HRBA is complex within Sida. 
Sida is not an as large organizations as the UN, but operates both globally, regionally and 
locally. There are strategies for each level where the rights perspective is stated, but those lack 
clarity as guiding documents, and goals for the HRBA do not always exist. Further, Sida has 
several thematic areas with polices, and together with diffuse directives from leading position, 
employees explain that it has been difficult to know what to focus on (Respondents 2B, 4B). 
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Moreover,  Darrow and Thomas (2005) argues that by adopting a HRBA development 
actors should aim at a positive transformation in the power relation among stakeholders and 
themselves.  This  relates  to  ownership,  which  importance  of  it  was  declared  in  the  Paris 
Declaration, and means that partner (recipient) countries own their development. Thus, Sida's 
staff are uncertain of to which extent to interfere and impose a HBRA, since it then can be 
seen as a donor driven agenda. It was acknowledged that full ownership is not be possible as 
Sweden as a donor country have certain requirements, such as those of a HRBA (Sida 2012 
(2): 2). One employee brought up the need for comprising, but admitted that it is difficult to 
negotiate  with  the  HRBA, since  the  method  involves  the  use  of  the  principles,  but  also 
because the HRBA put high demands on partner country, which can obstruct chances for the 
acceptance of it (Respondent 4B).
5.3 The issue of accountability
ActionAid defines the primary legal duty-bearer as the state and rights-holder as the citizens,  
but argue that in weak states, UN or other actors, like INGOs such as ActionAid are replacing 
primary duty-bearers (AAI 2010: 36).  ActionAid often works together with local authorities 
that are duty-bearers that may lack resources, and assist them in demanding resources from 
the national state authorities (Respondent 1A). However, claiming rights from duty-bearers is 
tricky in situations where governments do not have the resources, and then ActionAid need to 
focus  more  on needs  and service delivering (Respondent  2A).  Sida also states  that  weak 
governments often are unable to live up too its tasks, and to hold the state accountable is 
therefor difficult (Respondent 1B).  Jonsson reflected on a similar issue, and believed that 
inability of governments may be due to own rights violated (2004: 4).
Steffek et al states that it is questionable if NGOs are accountable to the people they 
work with, and whether they can be held accountable (in Steffek and Hahn 2010: 71). The 
responsibility of ActionAid employees was not explicitly mentioned in interviews, however 
evaluations stated that downward accountability mechanisms had functioned, by including 
locals in processes and sharing information (AAI TRS 2010: 25). In line with Darrow and 
Thomas (2005) and Uvin (2007), ActionAid's strategy states that while advocating for the 
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state to be accountable, it is necessary to also be accountable to rights holders, as well as to  
staff (AAI 2010: 49). Employees however, explained that how to integrate principles of the 
HRBA within the organizations was still unclear. 
Sida  argues  that  states,  if  having ratified  human rights  conventions,  are  required  to 
respect, protect and provide the rights for its citizens (Regeringskansliet 2010: 8, 11-12). Sida 
operates through dialogues with governments, to get them to realize their responsibility to 
fulfill the rights of its citizens, but also to tries to get them to understand their own winning of  
it. “However, we have to be diplomatic so they do not throw us out, because then we get 
nothing done.” (Respondent 2B). In fact, accountability has been the biggest challenge, and 
what Sida has worked the least with, as it requires changes that are not always pleasant for 
partner governments (Sida 2012: 107). Sida takes on responsibility for policy implementation, 
but  explicit  responsibility  towards  partner  country's  government  or  its  citizens  is  not 
mentioned  (Regeringskansliet  2010:  33). Further,  an  employee  explains  that  Sida's 
responsibility is to analyze risks, and to have mechanisms to ensure that rights holders can 
give their complaints to the state. Accessibility to information about processes is necessary, 
and  how accountability  in  development  programs can  be  reached.  However  there  are  no 
mechanisms for rights-holders to demand accountability from Sida (Respondent 3B).
5.4 Main findings
Both Sida and ActionAid have an understanding of the HRBA in line with the consensus in 
the academic debate, and the definition by OHCHR (2006), and they aim to apply the core 
principles  of  the  approach  in  all  their  work.  Critiques  blame  development  actors  for 
announcing  their  commitment  to  HRBA,  where  little  change  is  seen  in  the  practical 
implementation of development programs (Kindornay et al 2012; Uvin 2007). In contrast to 
these authors, both Sida and ActionAid seem to have, according to their employees, done a 
severe shift in the way they are conducting development work (Respondents 1A, 2A, 3A, 1B, 
3B). However, the analysis found that there are certain strengths and weaknesses with the 
respective actor's implementation of the HRBA. An interesting result shows differences in 
their relation to governments, which affects their use as well as impact of the HRBA.
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Assist in developing capacities for rights holders to claim their rights as well as for duty 
bearers to fulfill their duties is central in a HRBA (Jonsson 2004: 6). This study has shown 
that, the main difference of a HRBA between Sida and ActionAid, is that Sida focus is on 
assisting governments, namely the duty bearer, where ActionAid takes sides with the poor, so-
called  rights-holders.  Archer  explains  that  ActionAid's  HRBA is  a  method  where  people 
living in poverty are assisted to become conscious of their rights and organized to claim those,  
hold  duty  bearers  accountable  and  confront  power  imbalances  (2011:  7).  Sida  may  also 
challenge states as duty-bearers, but mainly by discussing the rights they are responsible to 
protect and fulfill. Contrary, ActionAid educates the poor about their rights and how to claim 
them. ActionAid do not enter partnerships with states as their HRBA is critical towards them, 
but  can work closely to governments regarding particular  issues (AAI 2010:  53).  In fact, 
surveys showed that ActionAid appeared to be in direct conflict with governments. At least, 
the view of many locals was that ActionAid may see the government as an opponent rather 
than someone who can actually fulfill thier rights (AAI TSR 2010: 13). Sida, however, mainly 
works by supporting partner governments to reach development objectives and realize human 
rights. They also advocate, but through dialogue. ActionAid on the other hand are more in 
dialogue  with  the  people  on  the  local  level. As  Uvin  argues, discussions  can  serve  as 
mechanisms for accountability where legal mechanisms are inadequate (2007: 603). 
The  resource  demanding  nature  of  a  HRBA is  confirmed  by  both  actors,  in 
particular  in  terms  of  staff  in  its  initial  stages.  It  is  a  long-term method,  which  requires 
changes in attitudes, patterns and structures, but as  Darrow and Thomas (2005) argue, the 
HRBA is preventive as it focuses on problems and not the symptoms of them. As it is a most 
sustainable way known to conduct development, time and costs are argued to be worthwhile 
(AAI 2010: 67; Sida 2012: 103; Respondents 1-4A, 1-4B).
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6 Conclusions
In the last decades, several global development actors have taken on a HRBA to development 
as a response to previous failures in the aid industry. What characterizes the approach, are the 
principles of accountability, transparency, participation and nondiscrimination, and the use of 
human  rights  mechanisms  to  enable  the  fulfillment  of  development  goals.  A HRBA is 
believed  to  be  a  more  sustainable  way  of  conducting  development  as  it  aims  to  change 
structures and empower people to take action, be aware of their rights and own their own 
development.  
Researchers criticize the HRBA for being promoted at policy level, but not implemented 
in practice to the same extend. This study has looked at ActionAid and Sida, and confirms that 
the HRBA is more developed in strategies and policy-making. However, it has shown that 
ActionAid and Sida have done a severe shift in the way they work.  Their integration of the 
HRBA into policies are similar to each other and match the general academic idea of what a 
HRBA is. Both ActionAid and Sida are close to policymaking but not fully there, and they 
strive to further integrate the HRBA in their practices. Sida's width of focus areas, policies  
and directives, have obstructed a coherent adoption of the HRBA both within the organization 
and in programming. 
Results show that differences in the implementation of the HRBA are mainly in the 
relations with the governments. Both ActionAid and Sida work with advocacy, Sida by trying 
to influence and support governments through dialogue and ActionAid by organizing the poor 
towards the government.  Sida as a state agency have a strength in holding more political 
power  and  thereby  potential  for  influencing  other  states. However,  as  maintaining  good 
relations with other governments is required, imposing a HRBA in partnerships is not always 
easy. A strength of ActionAid as an INGOs is that they do not have to come on terms with 
governments to the same extent. Further, as assumed, ActionAid operate closer to the grass-
roots levels and can therefor easier enable participation of the poor. 
Both  actors  have  met  challenges  with  applying  and  implementing  the  principle  of 
accountability, which confirms the issue of it, as debated in academia. Obstacles for Sida are 
more of a diplomatic sort, as they have to be on good terms with partner governments and 
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cannot push too strongly, whereas ActionAid seems to lack tools for holding duty bearers to 
account.  
In  conclusion,  differences  as  actors  can explain variations  in  implementation  of  the 
HRBA, but weaknesses in the approach obstructs possibilities to put into practice.  Findings 
showed tensions and diffusion around the principle accountability. The integration of rights in 
development is supposed to give access to human rights mechanisms to reach development 
objectives,  but  the  HRBA offers  no  such  tools  in  reality.  States  are  argued  to  have  the 
responsibility for a human rights even though not always translated into national state law. 
However, when entering a partnership for development cooperation, all actors hold some sort 
of responsibility for the operations they are a part  of and for those that  are affected.  The 
blurriness of the principle of accountability may be the primary hinder for the implementation 
of  a  HRBA.  For  further  use  and  success  of  the  HRBA,  this  thesis  suggests  that  future 
researchers as well as development and human rights professionals, focus on and come to 
some sort  of coherence on responsibilities  and enhanced guidance for how accountability 
should be addressed.
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Appendix 1
Interview Guide
1. What do you mean by a HRBA to development?
(What rights? How does it differ from other approaches?)
2. Why has your organization decided to use an HRBA to development?
3. How do you work with a HRBA in practice? (Practical implementation)
4. What are the prospect with using a HRBA to development?
5. Do you see any constraints with a HRBA? (Challenges? If, which?)
6. Can your organization perform a HRBA differently than (non)state actors?
7. Who do you define as the duty-bearer, or the one accountable for human rights and 
development? (Who else have responsibilities? What? What is the responsibility of 
your organization?)
8. What constraints or challenges may you encounter when trying to hold duty-bearer 
accountable? (How do you overcome those challenges?)
9. Du you see any differences in your organizations' policies and the implementation of 
the HRBA? (Challenges ahead?)
10. Anything you would like to add? Questions?
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